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Introduction 
In a previous paper we tested a theory of investment behavior based on the 
neoclassical theory of the firm at the level of the individual corporation 
(Jorgenson and Siebert, 1968). More specifically, we have compared the 
neoclassical theory with alternative explanations of corporate investment 
behavior  based  on  considerations  of  liquidity,  expected  profits,  and 
capacity utilization. For any of the conventional measures of goodness of 
fit-minimum  residual variance, conformity of turning points, number of 
coefficients exceeding twice their standard errors-the  performance of the 
neoclassical theory is superior to that of the alternative theories.1 
In this paper we study the neoclassical theory of corporate investment 
behavior in more detail. We begin by outlining a theory of optimal capital 
accumulation based on  maximization of  the  market value  of  the firm. 
From a purely formal point of view, the theory is simply the intertemporal 
analogue of  the usual atemporal theory based on  profit maximization. 
Under our characterization of technology, a more direct connection with 
profit maximization may be developed. Maximization of the value of the 
firm implies maximization of profit at each point of time, where profit is 
defined as the difference between net revenue on current account and the 
implicit rental value of capital services supplied by the firm to itself. The 
implicit rental is calculated through a "shadow"  or accounting price for 
capital services that depends on the cost of capital, the price of investment 
goods, the rate of change of this price, and the tax structure for business 
income.2 Of course, profit in this sense differs from the usual accounting 
definition for tax purposes. 
' Detailed comparisons of the performance  of the alternative  theories of corporate 
investment  are given in Jorgenson and Siebert  (1968, Tables 2, 4, and 5). 
2 Equivalence between maximization of the market value of the firm and maxi- 
mization of profit at each point of time is discussed by Malinvaud  (1953) and, more 
recently, by Arrow (1964). The essential idea is implicit in Haavelmo's theory of 
investment (1960). 
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The neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation implies a theory 
of the cost of capital. The market value of the firm is equal to the discoun- 
ted value of cash flow net of direct taxes. The appropriate after-tax rate 
of  discount is the cost  of  capital employed in the accounting price for 
capital services used in the choice of an optimal level of capital services at 
each point  of time. The cost of capital can be measured from net cash 
flow, the market value of the firm, and the change in this market value. 
This theory of the cost of capital has been developed by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958, 1966). 
While the neoclassical theory assigns an important role to the cost of 
capital, it also attributes considerable importance to the rate of change of 
the price of investment goods. Changes in this price result in capital gains 
and losses that must be included in the calculation of economic profit or 
loss  associated  with  alternative production  plans.  Holding  the  other 
determinants of the price of capital services constant, a high rate of change 
of  prices of  investment goods  should provide an incentive to  use more 
capital, while a low rate of change should serve as a disincentive. One of 
the purposes of this paper is to evaluate the effects of inflation on the level 
of investment. The rate of inflation will be studied along with other deter- 
minants of the implicit rental for capital services, including the cost  of 
capital, the level of prices of investment goods, and the tax structure. 
We take the level of capital determined by maximization of the market 
value of the firm as the desired level. By permitting discrepancies between 
desired and actual levels of capital, the model can incorporate the effects 
of  gestation  lags  in  investment and  lags  between actual  and  expected 
values of the determinants of investment. With perfect foresight, the actual 
and expected values of these determinants would be identical and the actual 
level of capital would always equal the desired level. Thus, we relax the 
assumption of perfect foresight that underlies conventional treatments of 
the neoclassical theory of  optimal capital accumulation. Our model  of 
investment takes account of uncertainty through the use of stock-market 
information to infer the cost of capital and through permitting discrepan- 
cies between actual and desired levels of capital. 
Theoretical Framework 
In  the  neoclassical  theory  of  corporate investment behavior, the  firm 
selects a production plan so as to maximize its market value. For the de- 
scription of technology we adopt, maximization of market value is implied 
by maximization of profit at every point of time, present and future, where 
profit is defined as net revenue on current account less the implicit rental 
value of capital services. We call the resulting level of demand for capital 
services the desired level of capital. If desired and actual levels of capital are CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  I I25 
always equal, investment is simply the change in desired capital plus re- 
placement investment. We assume that desired and actual levels may be 
different, but that in each period new investment goods are ordered up to a 
level that will equate desired and actual capital when all outstanding orders 
have been delivered. Actual delivery is assumed to be distributed over time, 
so that investment net of replacement is a distributed lag function of past 
changes in the level of desired capital services. By permitting desired and 
actual levels of capital to differ,  we relax the assumption of perfect foresight 
that  underlies the  conventional  treatment of  neoclassical theory.  Such 
differences are not  consistent with the assumption of  perfect foresight, 
even if allowance is made for the fact that the investment process requires 
time. An economic agent with perfect foresight can plan investment proj- 
ects so that the projects are completed at exactly the moment the need for 
them arises. 
To complete the theory of investment behavior, it is necessary to specify 
the determinants of replacement investment. We assume that replacement 
is proportional to capital stock at the beginning of the period. In repeated 
tests, both at the aggregate level and for individual firms, this theory has 
proved satisfactory as a representation of replacement investment.3 
More formally, the market value of the firm is defined as the discounted 
value of cash flow less direct taxes; cash flow is the value of output less the 
value of expenditures on current account and outlays on capital account: 
R = pQ-sL-qI,  (1) 
where R is the cash flow, p the price of output and Q the quantity, s the 
price of current  input and L the quantity, and q the price of investment goods 
and I the quantity. In addition to its outlays for current inputs and in- 
vestment goods, the firm must also pay direct taxes, say D; these taxes must 
be deducted from cash flow in calculating the value of the firm. The market 
value is the discounted value of cash flow net of direct taxes: 
00 
W(t) =  f  e  It  (9)d  [R(r) -  D(r)]dr,  (2) 
where W is market value and r the cost of capital. At each point of time, 
the objective of the firm is to maximize its market value. 
The amount of  direct taxes at any point  of  time depends on the tax 
structure. A  first approximation to  the corporate tax structure for  the 
United States may be obtained by assuming that the rate of tax is constant 
at any point of time and that business income for tax purposes is defined as 
revenue on current account less outlays on current account and certain 
I See Meyer and Kuh (1957, pp. 91-94) and Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967b, 
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deductions on capital account; these deductions are proportional to re- 
placement, to the cost of capital, and to capital gains or losses on assets. 
Direct taxes may then be represented as: 
D =  u[pQ  -  sL -  q(w8 + vr  -xq)K 
where u is the tax rate and w the proportion of replacement, v the pro- 
portion of cost of capital, and x the proportion of capital losses deductible 
for tax purposes. The rate of replacement, 8, is assumed to be constant. 
For our sample of corporations, the proportions of cost  of capital and 
capital losses deductible for tax purposes are negligible, so that  the  ex- 
pression for direct taxes may be simplified: 
D  =  u(pQ  -  sL -  w~qK).  (3) 
Needless to say, numerous features of the U.S. tax structure are not repre- 
sented explicitly in this formulation; however, even this simplified form 
allows for variations in the tax rate and in provisions for depreciation 
allowances over time. 
The market value of  the firm is maximized, subject to  a production 
function: 
Q =  F(K, L).  (4) 
Output depends on input of capital services and current input. The rate of 
investment must be related to the quantity of capital services available; 
we assume that replacement is proportional to capital stock, so that net 
investment equals the difference between investment and replacement: 
K=  I-8K.  (5) 
As before, the rate of replacement, 8, is assumed to be constant. Further, 
we assume that the flow of capital services at every point of time is pro- 
portional to capital stock. This description of technology makes possible 
the correspondence between maximization of value of the firm and maxi- 
mization of  profit suggested above.  Before developing this correspond- 
ence, we consider the definition of the cost of capital. 
The cost of capital in the expression for the market value of the firm is an 
after-tax rate of  discount.  Differentiating the market value of  the firm 
with respect to time, we obtain: 
R-D  W 
The cost of capital is cash flow net of direct taxes divided by the market value 
of the firm plus the rate of growth of the market value. An essentially equiv- 
alent definition has been used by Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1966).4 
I Measurement  of the cost of capital  from accounting  data is discussed  in the Statis- 
tical Appendix to a more extensive multilithed version of this paper available from 
the authors. CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  1127 
For maximization of the market value of the firm subject to the pro- 
duction  function  and  the  constraint relating investment  to  change  in 
capital, the necessary conditions are identical to conditions for maximiza- 
tion of profit before taxes at each point of time,  where profit is defined as: 
P=  pQ-sL-cK.  (7) 
The unit rental of capital, c, is the " shadow" or accounting price of capital 
services before taxes: 
c=  q -r  +  (I-uw)8-]q  (8) 
Comparing the definition of profit (7) with the definition of  business 
income for tax purposes in  (3), we see that profit excludes the cost  of 
capital and includes capital gains whether realized or not. Depreciation for 
tax purposes is not necessarily equal to economic depreciation. We con- 
clude that the concept of profit appropriate  for maximization of the market 
value of  the firm is not identical to  business income as defined for tax 
purposes. It should come as no  surprise that businessmen express little 
interest  in  the  maximization  of  accounting  "profit." The  appropriate 
criterion is maximization of profit defined in a special sense as revenue 
minus cost  on  current account less the  implicit rental value of  capital 
services. 
To complete the empirical formulation of the theory of corporate in- 
vestment, we assume that the production function (4) may be taken to be 
Cobb-Douglas in form. Under this assumption, the desired level of capital, 
say K+,  is proportional to  the value of  output divided by the price of 
capital services, 
K+  =  apQ,  (9) 
where a is the elasticity of output with respect to capital services.6 Second, 
we assume that investment projects to expand capacity require time for 
completion so that net investment in every period is a weighted average of 
past starts. Finally, we assume that at each point of time new investment 
projects are initiated so as to equate desired and actual capital services 
when all projects underway are completed. The level of new starts is equal 
to  the change in desired capital from period to period. Under these as- 
sumptions, net investment is a distributed lag function of  past changes 
in the level of desired capital. 
5  These necessary conditions are derived by Jorgenson (1965, pp.  43-47).  This 
analysis is easily extended  to optimal capital accumulation  with any number  of assets, 
including inventories and working capital. 
6  For a detailed derivation,  see Jorgenson  (1965, p. 53). An interesting  set of results 
supporting  the Cobb-Douglas function at the level of the individual  firm has recently 
been presented  by Eisner (1967a). I128  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
To make notation for a distributed lag function concise, we introduce 
the lag operator, L, defined as: Lx, =  xt-1.  With this notation, the final 
form of the distributed lag function used in our empirical work is: 
It  =  y(L)(Kt+  -  Kt+_1)  +  [1 -  -K(L)](It -  K)  +  3Kt-1 +  Et,  (10) 
where the time structure of investment behavior is characterized by the 
polynomials in the lag operator, y(L) and w(L).7 The sequence of random 
errors, Et,  is assumed to have expected value zero, constant variance, and 
to be serially independent. As an example, if the distributed lag function 
involves current and lagged changes in desired capital and lagged net in- 
vestment, the final form of the distributed lag function may be written: 
It  =  Pt(  Qt  Pt-)Qt-i  +  ([Pt-lQt-_  Pt-2Qt-2] 
-  il(It  1-  I-  K-1)  +  8Kt-1  ?+ 'Et 
Empirical Results 
In  developing and  testing a  theory of  corporate investment  behavior, 
we have attempted to  avoid biases that could arise from inappropriate 
assumptions about the homogeneity of investment behavior across firms. 
Data on individual firms have been analyzed using both time series and 
cross-section models.  The  study of  Meyer and  Kuh  (1957) was  based 
primarily on  cross sections.  Subsequently, Kuh  (1963) has  shown  that 
cross sections for successive years do not provide a stable explanation of 
investment behavior. The intercepts for cross  sections exhibit a  strong 
pattern of cyclical variation, suggesting that the dynamic specification of 
the  models  used for  individual cross sections  is  incorrect. In  order to 
specify the lag structure correctly at the level of the individual firm, we 
have concentrated on time series data for a small but representative  sample 
of firms selected from the Fortune Directory (1962) of the five hundred 
largest U.S. industrial corporations for 1962. For each individual firm we 
determine an  appropriate specification of  the  lag  between changes  in 
demand for capital and investment expenditures. We do not assume that 
the parameters for all firms are the same for cross sections at a given point 
of time. Further, we do not assume that the time structure of investment 
behavior is the same for all firms. 
To sample a broad range of industrial activity, we selected a total of 
fifteen  firms representing fourteen  of  the  two-digit  manufacturing in- 
dustries. Since 1934, all firms whose stock is traded publicly have had to 
file annual reports, consisting of complete income statements and balance 
I For further discussion of this distributed  lag function, see Jorgenson (1965, pp. 
47-48,  53-55). Statistical methods appropriate  for distributed lag functions of  this 
type are given by Jorgenson (1966). CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  1 I29 
sheets, with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We excluded firms 
that lost their identity through mergers during the period and firms that 
shifted accounting years or changed the degree of consolidation in their 
financial reports. Limitations of data made it necessary to concentrate on 
larger firms. We  began by  selecting the  largest firm in  each  two-digit 
industry of manufacturing; in some cases, the appropriate data were un- 
available for the largest firm, so we selected the next largest firm, and so on. 
The firms included in our sample are listed in Table 1. Although all of the 
firms are large, they vary considerably in both size and rate of growth. The 
average amounts of investment and capital stock for each firm are given in 
Table 1. 
Our dependent variable, gross investment in constant dollars of  1954, 
is the current value of investment in plant and equipment deflated by the 
investment goods price index for manufacturing. Capital stock was cal- 
culated by selecting an initial and terminal value of depreciable assets net 
of depreciation, deflating these bench-mark levels by fixed capital stock 
deflators for the firm's industry group, and interpolating the bench marks 
by using gross investment in constant prices. The value of  output was 
measured by sales plus the change in inventory stock. 
In the  neoclassical theory of  corporate investment behavior, desired 
capital is equal to the value of  output deflated by the accounting price 
TABLE  1 
Average 
Amount  of  Capital 
Firm  Investment*  Stockt  Two-Digit  Industry 
General  Motors  .7670  3.1225  Motor  vehicles  and  equip- 
ment 
Goodyear  Tire and  Rubber  .0554  .3616  Rubber  products 
American  Can  .0414  .5374  Other durables 
Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass  .0345  .3128  Stone,  clay,  and  glass 
United  States  Steel  .2980  2.9437  Primary  iron  and  steel 
General  Electric  .1190  .7247  Electrical  machinery  and 
equipment 
Reynolds  Tobacco  .0127  .1267  Other non-durables 
Du  Pont  .1540  .9404  Chemicals  and  allied 
products 
Anaconda  .0511  .7077  Primary  non-ferrous  metal 
Standard  Oil, N.J.  .6274  6.3560  Petroleum and coal products 
International  Paper  .0563  .4780  Paper  and  allied  products 
Westinghouse  Air Brake  .0038  .0393  Transportation  equipment, 
excluding  motor  vehicles 
International  Business  .1839  .9492  Machinery,  except electrical 
Machines 
Swift  .0266  .2467  Food  and  beverage 
Westinghouse  Electric  .0497  .3841  Electric  machinery  and 
equipment 
* Mean annual gross investment for the postwar period, 1946-1963, in billions of 1954 dollars. 
t End-of-year  net fixed assets for 1961 in billions of 1954 dollars. 
SOURCE.-Jorgenson  and Siebert (1968, Table 1). 1130  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
of capital services. The price of capital services (8) depends on the cost of 
capital, the price of investment goods, the rate of change of the price of 
investment goods, and the tax structure. To measure the rate of return, we 
define gross business income as the sum of profits before taxes, deprecia- 
tion, and interest. Gross business income is equal to the value of capital 
services for all classes of assets. From balance-sheet data we were able to 
obtain the value of depreciable and depletable assets and the value of in- 
ventories and cash plus accounts receivable. We derived an expression for 
the price of capital services for each of these four classes of assets, using the 
expression (8) given above with appropriate specializations. The price of 
capital services for each asset class depends on the cost of capital; given the 
fact that gross business income is the sum of the values of all capital ser- 
vices, we determine the cost of capital. 
To assess the effects of variations in the rate of change of the price of 
investment goods on the level of investment, we consider two alternative 
versions of the neoclassical theory. First, we assume that capital gains are 
taken into  account in investment decisions so  that the price of  capital 
services is precisely as given above in (8). Second, we assume that capital 
gains are regarded as transitory in both the price of capital services and 
the cost of capital. In this formulation, the price of capital services becomes: 
c=  q  [r +  (1 -uw)S].  (I1 
The corresponding measure of  the cost  of  capital excludes the rate of 
capital gains and losses from the rate of return. We refer to the neoclassical 
theory including capital gains as Neoclassical I and the theory excluding 
capital gains as Neoclassical II. Except for the differences in the price of 
capital services and the cost of capital, the theories are identical. 
The best fitting distributed lag function for each of the two versions of 
the neoclassical theory of corporate investment behavior is presented for 
the fifteen firms of our sample in Table 2. Distributed lag functions were 
fitted to data for the postwar period, 1949-63, and for the postwar and 
prewar period,  1937-41 and  1949-63, combined. For evaluation of  the 
effects of inflation on investment behavior, the postwar data are the most 
relevant. Data for the prewar period were included in order to examine 
the effects of adding observations from a period with quite different eco- 
nomic  conditions.  Since some  of  the  distributed lag  functions  employ 
as many as three lagged changes in desired capital, and since data are 
available only since 1934, the years 1934-36 and  1946-48 could not  be 
used for unlagged variables. Data for United States Steel are not available 
for 1934, and data for Pittsburgh Plate Glass for 1963 are not comparable 
with those for previous years. The column labeled X1 contains the intercept 
in the  regression; columns X2, X3, and X4 contain estimates of  the pa- 
rameters-ayo,  ay1,  aY2-and  columns X5 and X6 give  estimates of  the CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  II3I 
parameters-w1,  w2;  the final column, X7, gives an estimate of the rate of 
replacement, 8. 
As an example, the final form of the distributed lag function for General 
Motors for the Neoclassical I model of corporate investment behavior for 
the period 1949-63 may be written: 
itfl+cgo  Pt Qt  Pt-lQt-i)  +  ay,  Pt-lQt-1  t-2Qt-  2 
I~~~~~t  =  t  +  Y  Cat- 1  Ct-l  Ct2 
-  wl(It-  -8Kt-1)  +  8Kt_1  +  Et. 
Substituting the numerical values from Table 2 for the unknown param- 
eters, we obtain: 
It=.2449 +  .0160 lPtQt  Pt-lQt-i  +  .00  Pt-lQt-  Pt-2Qt-2 
(.0063)  ct  Ct  -1  (.0066)  Ct  -1  Ct -  2 
-  .3444  (It  - 1  8Kt  - 1) +  .1794Kt- 1. 
(.2061)  (.0540) 
Similar results are given for the Neoclassical  II model  of corporate in- 
vestment behavior. Results are given for the postwar period, 1949-63, and 
for the combined prewar and postwar period, 1937-41 and 1949-63, for all 
fifteen firms included in  our sample.  For Du  Pont, the Neoclassical  II 
model  does  not  provide a  sufficiently good  explanation  of  investment 
behavior that  any  of  the  lagged changes  in  desired capital  lower  the 
standard error of the regression; therefore, no empirical results are given 
for this model for Du Pont. Goodness-of-fit statistics for the neoclassical 
models-the  coefficient of multiple determination, R2; the standard error 
of the regression, s;  and the Durbin-Watson ratio, d-are  also given in 
Table 2. 
None of the estimates given in Table 2 constrains the coefficients of the 
distributed lag  function  to  be  non-negative.  Where the  unconstrained 
estimates failed to satisfy the non-negativity constraint, this constraint was 
employed to obtain revised estimates.8 The constrained estimates for the 
postwar period are given in Table 3. This table has the same format as 
Table 2,  and the results may be interpreted by analogy with those  for 
Table 2. The sum of the coefficients of the polynomial y(L)  must equal 
the sum for w(L). Using this fact, we separate the estimates of the param- 
eters-yo,  Y1, Y2-from  our estimates  of the parameters-ayo,  ay,,  aY2.9 
8 Necessary and sufficient conditions for non-negativity are given by Jorgenson 
(1966, pp. 146-47). The procedure employed by Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967b) 
was used, except for Neoclassical I for American Can and Reynolds Tobacco and 
for  Neoclassical II  for  Reynolds  Tobacco.  For  American Can,  the  constraint 
Y2  2  W1/11  +  W2P0  was violated; accordingly,  the regression  was rerun with Y2 =  0. 
For Reynolds Tobacco, the parameter  C2  was allowed to differ  from zero in the Neo- 
classical I model, while the parameter  S was set equal to zero in the Neoclassical II 
model. 
I The method of estimation is discussed by Jorgenson (1966, p. 148). II32  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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The corresponding estimates of  the elasticity of  output with respect to 
capital are given in Table 4. These estimates appear to be somewhat low; 
this bias is probably due to the magnification of errors of measurement in 
the explanatory variables through the process of first-differencing  desired 
capital and the price of investment goods. It appears likely that the relative 
bias in the estimates of the parameters-ay0,  ay1, aY2-is  the same. While 
estimates of  the  elasticity of  output  with respect to  capital are biased 
downward, the derived estimates of the parameters-y0,  Y1,  Y2-are  un- 
affected by the bias.10 
As a test of the theory of replacement, estimates of the replacement rate 
from the fitted regressions may be compared with the rates computed from 
accounting data, as given in Table 5. For the postwar period, the hypoth- 
esis that  the rates computed from  the  accounting  data are the  correct 
ones is rejected only once for regressions based on the best fitting model, 
Neoclassical I. For the Neoclassical  II model, this hypothesis is rejected 
twice for regressions computed from postwar data. For the period as a 
whole, the hypothesis is rejected four times for both models. We conclude 
that the rates of replacement computed from accounting data are satis- 
factory for the postwar period for the Neoclassical I model. For the period 
as a whole, the fitted coefficients are generally closer to those derived from 
accounting data; however, the standard errors associated with the fitted 
coefficients are considerably smaller. Our results are generally similar to 
those of Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967b) for data on industry aggre- 
gates.11 The fitted replacement rates in our study are much more erratic 
TABLE  4 
ELASTICITY  OF OUTPUT  WITH RESPECT TO CAPITAL INPUT 
Firm  Neoclassical  I  Neoclassical  II 
General Motors ...  .......  .  .0472  .2026 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber .  .  .  .  .  .  .0146  .0212 
American Can  ...  ......  .  .  .0233  .0249 
Pittsburgh  Plate Glass  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0201  .0266 
United States Steel  ..  ......  .  .0518  .0493 
General Electric ...  .  ......  .  .0082  .0422 
Reynolds Tobacco  ..  ......  .  .0102  .0257 
Du Pont  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0020 
Anaconda  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0545  .0836 
Standard Oil, N.J.  ...  ...  .  .  .  .0280  .0490 
International  Paper  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0185  .0617 
Westinghouse  Air Brake  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0075  .0135 
International  Business Machines  ...  .0403  .1401 
Swift  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0014  .0011 
Westinghouse  Electric  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0037  .0153 
10 A similar bias has been reported  for a distributed  lag investment  function based 
on the hypothesis that desired capital is proportional to output; see Eisner (1967b). 
11  See Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967b, pp. 192-212). I  142  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
TABLE 5 
ANNUAL  RATES OF REPLACEMENT 
Firm  Replacement  Rate 
General Motors ..........  .  .. .  .2491 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1491 
American Can ..0631 
Pittsburgh  Plate Glass  .  .  .  ....  .  .  .  .0891 
United States Steel  ..1039 
General Electric .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1599 
Reynolds Tobacco  ..0806 
Du Pont  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1522 
Anaconda  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0634 
Standard  Oil, NJ .  .  ...  ..  .. .  ...  .0844 
International  Paper  ..1088 
Westinghouse  Air Brake  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0772 
International  Business Machines  ..2438 
Swift .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1059 
Westinghouse  Electric  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1269 
than those of Jorgenson and Stephenson, as indicated by the large standard 
errors associated with the corresponding regression coefficients. This is to 
be expected, given the much smaller number of observations for our study. 
Deviations between actual investment expenditures and fitted gross in- 
vestment12  provide evidence on  the  strong and weak points  of  the in- 
clusion of capital gains as a determinant of the cost of capital and the price 
of capital services. Capital gains are included for Neoclassical I and ex- 
cluded for Neoclassical II. A weak point of the Neoclassical I model is the 
explanation of investment behavior during the Korean war. For a number 
of firms, the change in desired capital stock variables hit a peak in 1951 
in response to a rapid price rise in that year and turned sharply downward 
in the following year. According to the theory underlying the Neoclassical 
I model, positive capital gains influence investment behavior through two 
interrelated  channels. First, positive capital gains lower the price of capital 
services, which raises desired capital and has a positive effect on invest- 
ment. Second, if  the price of capital  goods  increases, holders of corre- 
sponding assets receive capital gains which raise the cost of capital and 
hence the price of capital services. Where the capital gains are received on 
depreciable assets alone, the net effect will be to reduce the price of capital 
services and to stimulate investment expenditures. Both these influences 
were operating throughout 1950 and 1951; however, with the introduction 
of price controls and the allocation of investment expenditures on the basis 
of non-price considerations during the Korean war, the negligible observed 
12  Tinbergen  charts for the regressions  included in Table 2 for the postwar period 
are presented  in a more extensive version of this paper, available from the authors. 
Data underlying  the regressions  are described  in detail in a Statistical Appendix to 
the more extensive version. CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  I I43 
price change from 1951 to 1952 fails to reflect the continuation into 1952 
of strong incentives to invest. 
Considering the latter part of the postwar period, when non-price al- 
location played a less significant role, we find that the Neoclassical I model 
performs considerably better than Neoclassical II, particularly during the 
1955-57 peak in investment expenditures. Measured capital gains were 
large throughout these years and helped to reinforce  the incentives to invest 
resulting from changes in the level of output. The peak is predicted quite 
accurately for most firms, using the Neoclassical I model. The predicted 
values of investment of the Neoclassical II model, excluding capital gains, 
are generally lower than both the fitted values for the Neoclassical I model 
and the actual levels of  investment. No  doubt  some part of  the recent 
increase  in  capital  expenditures  can  be  attributed  to  "speculative" 
motives-that  is, to the rate of capital gains accrued on holdings of de- 
preciable assets. Our general conclusion is that Neoclassical I is superior to 
Neoclassical II in explaining postwar corporate investment behavior and 
that this superiority is especially marked for the period since the Korean 
war. We conclude that inflation does play a role in stimulating investment 
and that measurement of the cost of capital and the price of capital services 
for the prediction of investment expenditures should account for the rate 
of change of prices of investment goods. Our estimates of the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital seem to indicate that errors of measurement 
are of some importance; further research is required for improvements in 
the measurement of prices of investment goods, their rates of change, the 
cost of capital, and the price of capital services. 
Time Structure 
We turn now  to characterization of  the time structure of  corporate in- 
vestment behavior. Results from previous studies of corporate investment 
conflict sharply with results from surveys of new manufacturing plants by 
Mayer (1960). Mayer finds that the average time required  from the decision 
to undertake investment to the completion of construction is less than two 
years. In econometric studies of corporate investment, Grunfeld (1960) and 
Kuh (1963, pp. 293-302) have found that the average lag between changes in 
desired capital and actual expenditures ranges from five to ten years or 
more. Similar results have been reported for data at the level of industry 
groups by  Koyck  (1954,  pp.  74-110).  For  manufacturing and  its  sub- 
industries, Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967a) have corroborated Mayer's 
survey results. They obtain average lags between changes in desired capital 
and actual expenditures ranging from a year and a half to three years. 
There are two important differences between the econometric models of 
investment behavior used by Jorgenson and Stephenson and those  em- 
ployed by Grunfeld, Koyck, and Kuh. First, the earlier results are based on 1144  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
the flexible accelerator mechanism. Our results strongly suggest that the 
geometric distribution which underlies the flexible accelerator mechanism 
is very rarely the correct one. Of thirty distributed lag functions fitted for 
postwar and combined prewar and postwar data for the Neoclassical  I 
model of investment, the geometric lag distribution is the best specification 
of the lag distribution for only one firm in our sample-Swift  for the com- 
bined prewar and postwar period.13  A second difference between the two 
sets of results is the specification of desired capital. In the studies of Grun- 
feld, Koyck,  and Kuh, desired capital was assumed proportional to the 
market value of the firm, the level of output, and the level of profits or 
sales, respectively; the results given in our previous paper suggest that both 
Neoclassical I and Neoclassical II specifications of desired capital provide 
a superior explanation of investment behavior. 
We turn now to an analysis of the time structure of investment behavior 
for each of the firms included in our sample. To study the time structure, 
it is useful to  derive estimates of  the coefficients of  the distributed lag 
function14  from the estimates of the parameters y, and co, obtained from 
the regressions for the period 1949-63 presented in Tables 2 and 3. These 
estimates are presented in Table 6 in column Gus";  the coefficient p  corre- 
sponds to Lag 0, the coefficient ,u1  corresponds to Lag 1, and so on. We 
present only the first six terms in the sequence. Since each sequence sums 
to unity, the sum of all remaining terms may be estimated as unity minus 
the sum of the first six terms. This estimate is called the " Remaining Lag," 
in Table 6. The average lags are also given in Table 6. 
The  distributed lag  function characterized by  the sequence of  param- 
eters ju,  is a relationship between net investment and changes in desired 
capital. To study the economic impact of changes in the determinants of 
desired capital-for  example, changes in the tax structure-it  is useful to 
characterize the  relationship between gross investment and  changes  in 
desired capital.15 Gross investment is the sum of net investment and re- 
placement investment. Replacement is proportional to capital stock, but 
capital stock depends on past gross investment, so that the coefficients of 
the distributed lag between gross investment and changes in desired capital 
are: vo ==  [4o, l  :--  =~  y-  (I  -  )P,  V2  =  tZ2  -  (l  -8)jl,  ...,  where  vo 
corresponds to Lag 0, v1 to Lag 1, and so on. Estimates of these coefficients 
are presented in Table 6 in column "va." 
To characterize the response of gross investment to a change in desired 
capital that persists for, say, 0 periods of time, we calculate the sequence 
of cumulative sums to of the sequence vT 
0  0-1 
o=  =  o  +  :K 
T=0  T=0 
13  Similar  results are reported  by Jorgenson  and Stephenson  (1967b, pp. 181-85). 
14  These estimates  are derived  by the method given by Jorgenson  (1966, p. 146). 
15  For further detail, see Jorgenson (1965, pp. 79-80). CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  1145 
TABLE  6 
TIME FORM OF LAGGED RESPONSE (BASED ON DATA  FOR 1949-63) 
NEOCLASSICAL  I  NEOCLASSICAL  II 
LAG  (r)  HI  vX  v 
General  Motors: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3384  .3384  .3384  .2028  .2028  .2028 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4337  .1796  .5180  .3242  .1719  .3747 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1494  -  .1763  .3417  .1751  -  .0684  .0364 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0514  -.0607  .2810  .1207  -.0108  .2956 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0177  -  .0209  .2610  .0652  -  .0254  .2701 
5  .  .  I  I  I  .  .0061  -  .0072  .2529  .0449  -  .0040  .2661 
Remaining  .  .  .0032  -.0038  ...  .0672  -.0170  ... 
Average  Lag  .  1.0092  ...  ...  2.0260  ...  ... 
Goodyear: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .6780  .6780  .6780  .5330  .5330  .5330 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3220  -  .2550  .4230  .2876  -  .1660  .3670 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  0  -  .2739  .1491  .1163  -.1283  .2387 
3 ......  0  0  .1491  .0418  -.0572  .1815 
4  ......  0  0  .1491  .0141  -.0215  .1600 
5 .  .  I  I  I  I  0  0  .1491  .0046  -  .0074  .1526 
Remaining  .  .  0  0  ...  .0001  -.0037  ... 
Average  Lag  .  .3219  ...  ...  .7393  ...  ... 
American  Can: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1075  .1075  .1075  .4096  .4096  .4096 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3484  .2477  .3552  .5904  .2066  .6162 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0585  -  .2679  .0873  0  -  .5531  .0631 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1896  .1348  .2220  0  0  .0631 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0318  -  .1458  .0762  0  0  .0631 
5  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1031  .0733  .1496  0  0  .0631 
Remaining  .  .  .1621  -.0865  ...  0  0  ... 
Average  Lag  .  3.1512  ...  ...  .5904  ...  ... 
Pittsburgh  Plate  Glass: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3178  .3178  .3178  .5740  .5740  .5740 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3122  .0227  .3405  .2782  -  .2446  .3294 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1696  -  .1148  .2257  .1012  -  .1523  .1771 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0921  -.0624  .1633  .0327  -.0594  .1176 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0500  -  .0339  .1295  .0099  -  .0199  .0978 
5 I.  .  0272  -  .0184  .1111  .0029  -  .0061  .0916 
Remaining  .  .0302  -.0220  ...  .0011  -.0025  ... 
Average  Lag  .  1.4930  ...  ...  .7420  ...  ... 
United  States  Steel: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1736  .1736  .1736  .2964  .2964  .2964 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4240  .2685  .4421  .4594  .1938  .4902 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2065  -  .1735  .2686  .1743  -  .2374  .2528 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1005  -  .0845  .1841  .0517  -  .1045  .1484 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0489  -  .0411  .1429  .0138  -.0326  .1159 
5  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0238  -  .0200  .1229  .0035  -  .0089  .1069 
Remaining  .  .  .0226  -.0190  ...  .0009  -.0030  ... 
Average  Lag  .  1.6105  ...  ...  1.0424 
General  Electric: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3049  .3049  .3049  .2935  .2935  .2935 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2722  .0160  .3209  .3791  .1326  .4261 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1822  -  .0464  .2745  .2371  -  .0815  .3446 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1085  -  .0446  .2299  .0654  -  .1338  .2108 
4  .  .  .  0605  -  .0306  .1993  .0180  -  .0369  .1740 
5  .  .  .  0324  -  .0184  .1809  .0050  -  .0102  .1638 
Remaining  .  .  .0393  -.0210  ...  .0019  -.0039  ... 
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TABLE  6 (continued) 
TIME FORM OF LAGGED RESPONSE  (BASED ON DATA FOR 1949-63) 
NEOCLASSICAL  I  NEOCLASSICAL  II 
Lag  P)  VT  VT 
Reynolds  Tobacco: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1180  .1180  .1180  .0895  .0895  .0895 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2908  .1823  .3003  .1666  .0843  .1738 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2498  -  .0176  .2827  .1361  -  .0170  .1568 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1655  -  .0641  .2186  .1113  -  .0139  .1429 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0950  -  .0572  .1614  .0910  -  .0114  .1315 
5  .  .  .  I  I  .0487  -  .0386  .1228  .0744  -  .0093  .1223 
Remaining  .  .0314  -.0422  ...  .3312  -.0417  ... 
Average  Lag  .  2.1192  ...  ...  5.0000 
Du Pont: 
0  .0....  .  0  0  ...  ...  ...  ... 
1 ......  1.0000  1.0000  1.0000  ...  ...  ... 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  0  .8478  .1522  ...  ...  ... 
3 ......  0  0  .1522  ...  ...  ... 
4  ......  0  0  .1522  ...  ...  ... 
5 ......  0  0  .1522  ...  ...  ... 
Remaining  .  0  0  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Average  Lag  .  1.000  ...  ...  ...  ...  ... 
Anaconda: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2769  .2769  .2769  .2202  .2202  .2202 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2624  .0030  .2799  .2337  .0275  .2477 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1865  -  .0593  .2207  .1861  -  .0328  .2149 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1178  -  .0569  .1639  .1317  -  .0426  .1723 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0698  -  .0406  .1232  .0874  -  .0360  .1363 
5  .  .  .  .  I  .  .0397  -  .0257  .0976  .0556  -  .0262  .1101 
Remaining  .  .  .0470  -.0342  ...  .0853  -.0467  ... 
Average  Lag  .  1.7999  ...  ...  2.3319  ...  ... 
Standard  Oil,  N.J.: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4163  .4163  .4163  .5227  .5227  .5227 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3464  -  .0329  .3814  .2896  -  .1890  .3337 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2393  -  .0779  .3035  .1203  -  .1448  .1889 
3  ......  0  -.2191  .0844  .0444  -.0657  .1232 
4  ......  0  0  .0844  .0154  -.0253  .0978 
5  ......  0  0  .0844  .0051  -.0090  .0889 
Remaining  .  0.  0  0  ...  .0024  -.0045  ... 
Average  Lag  .  .8250  ...  ...  .7662  ...  ... 
International  Paper: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5513  .5513  .5513  .4149  .4149  .4149 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4486  -  .0424  .5086  .5851  .2153  .6302 
2  ......  0  -.3998  .1088  .  0  -.5214  .1088 
3  ......  0  0  .1088  0  0  .1088 
4  ......  0  0  .1088  0  0  .1088 
5  ......  0  0  .1088  0  0  .1088 
Remaining..  0  0  ...  0  0  ... 
Average  Lag  .  .4486  ...  ...  .5851  ...  ... 
Westinghouse  Air Brake: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .6267  .6267  .6267  .5407  .5407  .5407 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3733  -  .2050  .4217  .4593  -  .0397  .5010 
2  ......  0  -.3445  .0772  0  -.4238  .0772 
3  ......  0  0  .0772  0  0  .0772 
4  ......  0  0  .0772  0  0  .0772 
5  ......  0  0  .0772  0  0  .0772 
Remaining  ..  0  0  ...  0  0  ... 
Average  Lag  .  .3733  ...  ...  .4592  ...  ... CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  I I47 
TABLE 6 (continued) 
TIME  FORM  OF LAGGED  RESPONSE  (BASED  ON  DATA  FOR  1949-63) 
NEOCLASSICAL  I  NEOCLASSICAL  II 
Lag (-)  PT  Vs  V 
International  Business Machines: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5211  .5211  .5211  .5889  .5889  .5889 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4789  .0848  .6059  .4111  -.0342  .5547 
2  ......  0  -.3621  .2438  0  -.3109  .2438 
3  ......  0  0  .2438  0  0  .2438 
4  ......  0  0  .2438  0  0  .2438 
5  .0.  0  0  .2438  0  0  .2438 
Remaining  .  .  0  0  ...  0  0  ... 
Average  Lag  .  .4789  ...  ...  .4111  ...  ... 
Swift: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .4143  .4143  .4143  .4386  .4386  .4386 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2995  -  .0709  .3434  .2972  -  .0949  .3437 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .1600  -  .1078  .2355  .1511  -  .1147  .2290 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0747  -  .0683  .1673  .0683  -  .0668  .1622 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0322  -  .0346  .1326  .0289  -  .0321  .1301 
5  .  .  I  I  I  .  .0131  -.0157  .1169  .0118  -.0141  .1160 
Remaining  .  .  .0063  -.0110  ...  .0042  -.0101  ... 
Average  Lag  .  1.0894  ...  ...  1.0289  ...  ... 
Westinghouse  Electric: 
0  .  .  .  .  .  .  .5686  .5686  .5686 
1  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2540  .2540  .2540  .2800  -  .2165  .3521 
2  .  .  .  .  .  .  .3744  .1526  .4066  .1034  -.1410  .2111 
3  .  .  .  .  .  .  .2112  -.1157  .2910  .0339  -  .1563  .1548 
4  .  .  .  .  .  .  .0961  -  .0883  .2027  .0105  -  .0192  .1356 
5  .  .  I  .  I  .  .0397  -  .0443  .1584  .0031  -  .0060  .1295 
Remaining  .  .  .0246  -.0315  ...  .0005  -.0026  ... 
Average  Lag  .  2.3810  ...  ...  .6540  ...  ... 
The change in gross investment resulting from a unit change in desired 
capital 0 periods earlier is equal to the net investment, )uo,  plus replacement 
of investments that have already taken place,16  8  p  IL,.  Estimates of the 
elements  of this sequence  are given in column  " if " in Table  6. The sequence 
6, approaches 8 as a limit; to provide an indication of the distance  between 
the final value of this sequence given in Table 6 and the limiting value, the 
final value may be compared with rates of replacement for each firm given 
in Table 5. 
The time structure of investment behavior for the firms included in our 
sample is similar to that for two-digit industry groupings, as characterized 
by  Jorgenson and  Stephenson (1967a). Although  the  range of  average 
lags is considerably greater for individual firms than for industry groups, 
the average lag is concentrated in the range from one to two years. This 
coincides both with the estimates of Jorgenson and Stephenson and with 
the survey results of Mayer. The forms of the distributions are similar to 
those found by Jorgenson and Stephenson. For most firms, the response 
16  Further details are given by Jorgenson (1965, pp. 79-80)  and Jorgenson and 
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of gross investment to a change in desired capital during the first year is 
quite substantial. However, for Du Pont  and Westinghouse Electric this 
response is estimated to be zero using the Neoclassical I model. For other 
firms, the response ranges from .1075 for American Can to .6780 for Good- 
year using Neoclassical I and from .0895 for Reynolds Tobacco to .5889 
for IBM using Neoclassical II. The most common pattern from the Neo- 
classical I model is for the peak response of gross investment to a change 
in desired capital to be reached in the second year, again corroborating the 
results of  Jorgenson and  Stephenson.  Gross  investment then  declines, 
usually quite smoothly.  An  exception is  the  estimated time pattern of 
response for American Can, which appears to  be quite implausible. An 
equally common  pattern for the Neoclassical  II model  is for  the peak 
response of gross investment to be reached in the first year. 
On the basis of the similarity  between estimated distributed lag functions 
for the individual firms included in our sample and the estimated distrib- 
uted lag functions for two-digit industry groups estimated by Jorgenson 
and  Stephenson, we conclude that aggregation bias is  small. Although 
there is greater variability among individual firms than among industry 
groups, the basic quantitative results on average lags and the qualitative 
results on the shapes of the underlying lag distributions are quite similar 
for individual firms and for industry groupings. We conclude, further, that 
the sharp conflict between previous econometric studies of the lag struc- 
ture underlying investment behavior and survey results by Mayer is due to 
errors  in specification of the lag distribution and the desired level of capital. 
When these errors are corrected, the distributed lag functions, both for 
individual firms and for industry groups, yield the same characterization  of 
the time structure  of investment behavior as the results  from sample surveys. 
Conclusion 
The basic purpose of this paper has been to develop the implications of a 
theory of corporate investment behavior based on the neoclassical theory 
of optimal capital accumulation. This theory attributes considerable im- 
portance to the cost of capital and to the rate of capital gain or loss on 
assets. To test the implications of the theory for the impact of inflation on 
corporate investment behavior, we have developed two alternative versions 
of the neoclassical model of investment. In the first, Neoclassical  I, the 
rate of change of the price of investment goods is assumed to influence 
investment decisions directly. In the second, Neoclassical  II, the rate of 
change of the price of investment goods is assumed to be transitory and 
without direct effect on investment behavior. 
A comparison of the results from fitting the two neoclassical models of 
corporate investment behavior to  data  for  fifteen large manufacturing 
firms chosen from a wide variety of industry groups shows that inflation CORPORATE  INVESTMENT  BEHAVIOR  1 I49 
does have a substantial impact on investment, although this impact may 
be mitigated or offset entirely by the institution of  non-price allocation 
mechanisms for investment, as during the Korean war. During periods 
such as the  1955-57 investment boom  or the recent peak of investment 
activity, speculative motives for  investment, arising from high rates of 
capital gain on assets, play an important role in explaining levels of invest- 
ment, both during the investment peak and into the subsequent period of 
decline in investment expenditures. For prediction of the impact of changes 
in the determinants of investment expenditures in the absence of non-price 
allocation of investment goods, the effects of inflation must be taken into 
account. 
A  second implication of our theory of corporate investment behavior 
concerns the time structure of the underlying investment process. Previous 
characterizations of the time structure of corporate investment behavior 
conflict sharply with results from sample surveys and results from econo- 
metric studies of industry groups. Our empirical findings support the con- 
clusion that this conflict is due to  errors in the specification of  the lag 
distribution and the desired level of capital in previous studies of corporate 
investment. Our results conform to the results of surveys and to findings 
from studies of industry groupings by Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967). 
Of course, there is more heterogeneity in the time structure of investment 
behavior for individual firms. 
Considerable disenchantment with the economic theory of the firm has 
been evident in the theoretical literature, especially in the wake of  the 
Oxford studies on the price mechanism and similar studies in the United 
States, as summarized in the "marginalist" controversies of some twenty 
years ago.17  Simon (1962) has correctly emphasized that this disenchant- 
ment is not based on an examination of empirical evidence: 
I  should  like  to  emphasize strongly that  neither the  classical 
theory of the firm nor any of the amendments to it or substitutions 
for it that have been proposed have had any substantial empirical 
testing. If the classical theory appeals to us, it must be largely 
because it  has  a  certain face  validity ...  rather than  because 
profit maximizing behavior has been observed [p. 8.] 
Simon's characterization of substitutes for the classical theory of the firm 
is essentially correct. Although tests have been proposed that would dis- 
criminate between the classical theory of the firm and alternatives to it, 
for example, by Williamson (1963,  1964), empirical confirmation of  al- 
ternatives to the classical theory is lacking, at least so far. 
Simon's characterization of empirical evidence on the classical theory 
must be modified in light of econometric work on the theory of cost and 
production. Econometric studies of production are based almost entirely 
17  See Machlup (1967) for detailed references. I150  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
on the classical theory of the firm. The empirical evidence is so  largely 
favorable to  this theory that current research is  concentrated on  such 
technical questions as the appropriate form for the production function 
and the statistical specification of  econometric models  of  production.18 
Our results on corporate investment behavior also support the classical 
theory. 
Our version of  the classical theory of the firm must be carefully dis- 
tinguished from the atemporal theory of  the elementary textbooks,  ex- 
coriated by organization theorists such as Simon (1  962) and by economists 
such as Alchian (1965), Machlup (1967), and Williamson (1963, 1964). To 
maximize the welfare of the shareholders of the firm, businessmen should 
maximize the market value of the firm at every point of time. This objective 
does not lead to maximization of accounting profit at every point of time 
or  even  to  maximization  of  some  long-run average accounting  profit. 
For a model of technology such as that contained in relationships (4) and 
(5) of our theory of corporate investment, the objective of the firm is to 
maximize profit defined as the difference between revenue and outlay on 
current account and the implicit rental value of capital. We conclude that 
the  empirical support for  an  intertemporal version  of  the  neoclassical 
theory of the firm is very substantial. 
The neoclassical theory of the firm, simple as it is, suffices to explain 
such features of corporate activity as production, relative factor intensity, 
and investment behavior. Of course, this evidence deals with rather gross 
features of the activity of the firm; a theory of the firm that is adequate 
for describing the productive process may not be sufficiently specific with 
regard to  internal organization or structure of  ownership to  provide a 
useful basis for empirical studies of business organization. The problem to 
be solved in further development of the theory of the firm is not to provide 
an alternative to the neoclassical theory, but to provide a specialization of 
this theory that will preserve the basic results concerning optimal produc- 
tion  and capital accumulation while providing much more specific im- 
plications with regard to the organization and control of the corporation. 
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